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The Case for the Tax Collector
Marie T. Reilly

I. Introduction
Real property tax is always controversial. It is regressive and based
on dubious assessments of value.1 Proponents and detractors typically
debate tax rates, rebates, exemptions, and assessment.2 In contrast, discussion of the technicalities of tax collection—the means by which state
and local governments turn tax liability into cash revenue—is usually
left to tax collectors and other sinners.3 In bad economic times, however, tax enforcement becomes front page news.4 People become unable
or unwilling to pay real property taxes as their income and property values fall. The tax collector responds to their defaults with foreclosures.5
The case for relief from the press of tax and mortgage debt for delinquent property owners faced with loss of a home is easy to make.
Bankruptcy law provides an important source of this relief.6 This article
makes the more difficult case for the rights of the property tax collector.
Abandoned properties turn neighborhoods into wastelands.7 As the tax
base shrinks, revenues drop, and costs rise, the tax enforcement process
becomes critical to the survival of state and local governments and the
communities they serve. In bad economic times, the tax collector more
than ever needs a mechanism to seize property in satisfaction of tax
debt swiftly and with finality.8
Real property tax enforcement process varies among jurisdictions.9
Some features are common. Upon the tax debtor’s default, the tax creditor acquires a lien on the subject property, typically senior to all other
liens or interests.10 In most jurisdictions, the tax creditor either sells the
property at a public auction11 or assigns its secured collection right to
a third party via a public or private auction customarily known as a tax
lien sale.12 After expiration of the debtor’s time to redeem legal title to
the property by paying the tax plus interest, the third party forecloses
the debtor’s equity of redemption and takes title to the property free of
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all interests junior to the tax lien. In a few jurisdictions, the tax creditor
can enforce the lien and obtain a deed to the property without auction
or sale and without regard to the value of the property.13
If the property is worth more than the tax debt, the difference is the
debtor’s loss and the tax collector’s gain. A bidder at a tax lien sale will
take the prospect of the debtor’s redemption into account in bidding for
the tax collector’s rights. To the extent that the right to the property is
subject to post hoc reversal or avoidance, bidders will pay less and the
tax collector will collect less on account of its foreclosure rights. Softening the process to provide relief to debtors comes at the expense of
the tax collector and his constituents—state and local governments and
the citizens they serve.
If the debtor files for bankruptcy shortly after a wealth-depleting tax
foreclosure, the debtor’s creditors become interested in reversing the
transfer and recovering the lost wealth for the estate. The trustee can
characterize the transfer as a constructive fraud, made while the debtor
was insolvent, and for “less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange.”14 If the trustee’s argument is successful, the estate recovers
the property. The tax creditor retains a lien against the property for the
amount of the tax debt. However, the tax creditor loses to the estate the
difference between the value of the property and the tax debt.
The application of the trustee’s constructive fraud avoiding power to
tax lien foreclosures pits federal bankruptcy law against state tax law.
Federal bankruptcy law treats tax foreclosure as a “transfer” of the debtor’s property.15 It grants a bankruptcy trustee power to avoid the foreclosure and recapture lost wealth for the estate if, among other things, the
transfer is “for less than “reasonably equivalent value in exchange.”16 If
the hypothetical fair market value of the property is greater than the tax
debt, then transfer of the property to the tax collector appears to be “for
less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange.” From the tax collector’s perspective, however, assessment of the reasonableness of the
foreclosure transfer by reference to the fair market value of the property
makes no sense given the regulated conditions under which the foreclosure transfer actually occurs.
In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,17 the U.S. Supreme Court considered and resolved the conflict between federal and state law in the
context of a mortgage foreclosure sale. It held that the price a bidder
pays at a noncollusive, regularly conducted foreclosure sale is a “reasonably equivalent value in exchange” for the property.18 The transfer to
the winning bidder at the foreclosure sale is not avoidable under federal
fraudulent transfer law even if the bid is less than the hypothetical fair
market value of the property. In a footnote, the Court expressly limited
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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its opinion to “mortgage foreclosures of real property.”19 “The considerations bearing upon other foreclosures and forced sales (to satisfy tax
liens, for example) may be different.”20
This article considers the question the Court reserved in this footnote.
Is a transfer of property via a noncollusive, properly conducted property tax foreclosure process entitled to respect in bankruptcy against
the trustee’s fraudulent transfer avoiding power? It answers this question in the affirmative. Part II examines the Court’s opinion in BFP
and how courts have applied it in fraudulent transfer challenges to tax
foreclosure transfers. Most courts have read BFP as requiring a comparison between the conditions under which the tax foreclosure at issue
occurs and mortgage foreclosure. If the tax foreclosure process does
not require public sale with competitive bidding, then BFP does not
apply and the tax foreclosure transfer is not necessarily for “reasonably
equivalent value in exchange.” Part III criticizes this trend and makes
the argument in defense of the tax collector. A foreclosure sale yields
reasonably equivalent value because it complies with applicable nonbankruptcy law. Thus differences among the states in procedural attributes of tax or mortgage foreclosure transfers are not legally significant.
As the footnote in BFP suggests, tax foreclosure is different than mortgage foreclosure in one legally significant respect, and the difference is
in favor of the tax collector. A challenge to the “reasonableness” of a
transfer under state tax foreclosure law is a challenge to the legality of
the tax. Bankruptcy Code § 505 narrowly circumscribes the bankruptcy
court’s power to determine “the amount or legality of any tax.” It may
not substitute its judgment for that of the state legislature as to the validity and finality of tax foreclosure.
II. Tax Foreclosure and “Reasonably Equivalent Value” Under
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.
A partnership named BFP acquired a house in Newport Beach, California subject to a mortgage in favor of Imperial Savings Association.21
BFP defaulted, and Imperial properly noticed a foreclosure sale of the
property. A third party purchased the property for $433,000, 59% of the
property’s estimated fair market value.22 Three months later, BFP filed
for relief under Chapter 11. As debtor in possession, it sought to avoid
the transfer as a constructive fraud under § 548.
Section 548(a)(1) gives the trustee power to avoid certain prepetition transfers of the debtor’s property that occur within the two years
before the filing of a petition while the debtor is insolvent or which render him insolvent.23 In particular, § 548(a)(1)(B) permits the trustee to
avoid transfers if an insolvent debtor “voluntarily or involuntarily—(i)
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation.”24 Although the Bankruptcy Code defines “value”
for purposes of § 548, it does not define “reasonably equivalent value.”25
The bankruptcy court dismissed the fraudulent transfer action, holding that the sale was conducted without collusion or fraud and in compliance with California law. Thus the transfer price achieved was a
“reasonably equivalent value in exchange.”26 The district court and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.27
Justice Scalia, writing for a five-to-four majority, identified the issue
as whether the debtor received “less than reasonably equivalent value in
exchange” for the interest in real property that it lost at the foreclosure
sale.28 The transfer gave the winning bidder title to the property free
of the debtor’s equity of redemption in exchange for the foreclosure
sale price. The debtor in possession contended that the price was not a
“reasonably equivalent value in exchange” for the property because the
winning bid of $433,000 was not reasonably equivalent to $725,000,
the hypothetical fair market value of the property at the time of the sale.
The Court considered lower court opinions that used the fair market
value of the transferred property as the benchmark against which to
measure the “reasonable equivalence” of the foreclosure sale price.29
It also considered Matter of Bundles30 where the Seventh Circuit recognized a presumption that the price achieved at a properly conducted
foreclosure sale is a reasonably equivalent value, subject to rebuttal
based on evidence of the unreasonableness of a particular foreclosure.31
The Court rejected both approaches. It concluded that both improperly
referred to the estimated fair market value of the transferred property
as the measure of its worth for purposes of determining the “reasonable
equivalence” of the foreclosure sale price.32
The Court explained that comparison between hypothetical fair market value and the forced transfer price ignores: 1) the impact of market conditions on value; and 2) the traditional prerogative of states to
regulate creditors’ debt enforcement rights against property. On the first
point, as a matter of statutory interpretation, because Congress could
have used “fair market value” but chose “reasonably equivalent value”
instead, “[o]ne must suspect the language means that fair market value
cannot—or at least cannot always—be the benchmark.”33 When the
transfer occurs as part of a creditor-forced sale, the “fair” market value
referent is not a relevant point of comparison. “‘[F]air market value’
presumes market conditions that, by definition, simply do not obtain in
the context of a forced sale.”34 Property subject to foreclosure is worth
less than the same property valued under “fair market” conditions.35
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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On the second point, the Court recognized that the phrase “reasonably equivalent value” could be interpreted to require comparison of the
foreclosure sale price with a “reasonable” or “fair” forced sale price.36
However, it rejected this interpretation. The required determination—
whether a state-regulated foreclosure process is sufficiently “reasonable” as to yield a price that is the “reasonable equivalent” of the value
of the property—would be a federal encroachment on state authority to
regulate title to property that section 548 does not authorize.37
The Court related the first point to the second: the difference between
a forced sale price of property and its fair market value depends on the
terms of the forced sale, and the timing and manner in which the foreclosure occurs is a matter for states to decide. The Court observed that
mortgage foreclosure processes are not standard but vary among the
states “depending upon, among other things, how the particular State
values the divergent interests of debtor and creditor.”38 It summarized
typical features such as notice to the defaulting debtor, opportunity for
the debtor or another party in interest to redeem the property by paying the debt, and bidding rules and auction procedures.39 State law also
governs the finality of foreclosure. Once the process is complete under
state law, inadequacy of the foreclosure price is not grounds to set aside
the transfer, although some states recognize that a price so low as to
“shock the conscience” raises a rebuttable presumption of collusion or
actual fraudulent intent.40
The Court concluded that Congress could have intended that § 548
“disrupt the ancient harmony”41 between fraudulent conveyance law
and state foreclosure law.42 However, the phrase “for less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange” is insufficient textual guidance to
justify “such a radical departure.”43
The ominous footnote that “considerations bearing upon other foreclosures and forced sales (to satisfy tax liens, for example) may be different)” 44 offered no clue as to what aspects of tax foreclosures might
be different, or how such a difference might affect the balance between
federal and state authority. The footnote opened the way for bankruptcy
courts to evaluate the “reasonableness” of foreclosure transfers whenever
the transfer can be distinguished from the mortgage foreclosure in BFP.45
III. Tax Foreclosure Transfers and Reasonably Equivalent Value
After BFP, courts have struggled to determine its scope.46 A few
courts have held that, despite the footnote, tax foreclosures are not different than mortgage foreclosures. Both yield reasonably equivalent
value.47 Most courts have taken a narrower view of the scope of BFP.
For these courts, the key to the holding is similarity between the condi© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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tions under which the transfer occurs and those that define a free market
transaction, e.g., public notice, competitive bidding and other circumstances that tend to raise the transfer price toward fair market value.48
So, for example, if the transfer occurred by a process that exposed the
property to competitive bidding at an advertised public sale, the price
achieved through such a process is a “reasonably equivalent value in exchange” for the property, even if the price is far less than the hypothetical fair market value of the property. On the other hand, if the process
does not expose the property to competitive bidding, the transfer is not
necessarily “for reasonably equivalent value in exchange.”49
For example, in Murphy,50 the debtor failed to pay property tax to
the Town of Harrison during the three years that she held title, totaling
about $30,000.51 New York allows a tax creditor “strict foreclosure” of
property subject to a tax lien. At a fixed time after default, if the taxpayer has not paid the debt, title to the property is transferred to the
tax creditor in exchange for extinguishment of the debt.52 The Town
initiated an in rem proceeding to collect the unpaid property tax under
New York law.53 After the redemption period expired, the Receiver of
Taxes and Enforcement Officer for the Town conveyed the property to
the Town, and the Town cancelled the debtor’s tax liability.
Six months later, the debtor filed for bankruptcy relief. The Chapter 7
trustee challenged the transfer as an avoidable constructive fraud under
§ 548.54 The Town argued that under BFP the strict foreclosure of the
debtor’s property was for “reasonably equivalent value in exchange”
and not subject to fraudulent transfer avoidance.55 The trustee responded that BFP did not apply. It argued that the Court limited the holding
in BFP to real property mortgage foreclosures by sale with competitive
bidding. Because the strict foreclosure occurred without competitive
bidding, indeed without sale of any kind, BFP did not apply, and the
transfer was subject to avoidance under § 548 in the debtor’s subsequent
bankruptcy case. It noted that, “[u]nlike in a mortgage foreclosure under
New York law, where the market is redefined, the market is completely
destroyed by New York tax forfeiture proceedings.”56
Most courts considering a tax foreclosure after BFP have followed
this approach.57 The key for courts adopting this view is whether the
state-regulated foreclosure process is reasonable and, in particular,
whether it exposes the property to competitive bidding. In Murphy, the
court held that New York’s tax foreclosure process whereby the tax collector receives a deed to the property upon expiration of the debtor’s
redemption period simply does not yield a “price” that necessarily reflects the “value” of the property for purposes of “reasonably equivalent
value” under § 548.
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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Although this argument has proven appealing, the Court in BFP
squarely rejected it. The important aspect of a foreclosure transfer is not
how the state regulates it, but rather that the state regulates it. The fact
that a transfer occurs pursuant to a properly conducted, state-regulated
foreclosure process fully accounts for the difference between the value that the debtor receives (debt forgiveness) and the hypothetical fair
market value of the property. The difference is reasonable for fraudulent transfer purposes under bankruptcy law because the state-regulated
foreclosure process is entitled to respect in bankruptcy without regard
to whether the state regulated processes themselves are reasonably calculated to return the highest possible value to the debtor.
The Court in BFP compared state foreclosure law with zoning law: both
affect the “value” of the property, and neither can be ignored by a bankruptcy court determining the property’s “value.” It held: “Absent a clear
statutory requirement to the contrary, we must assume the validity of this
state-law regulatory background and take due account of its effect.”58
IV. Tax Claims Are Different
As the ominous footnote in BFP suggests, tax lien foreclosures are
different from mortgage foreclosures. However, the difference has nothing to do with competitive bidding. The difference arises because of the
nature of the tax collector’s right and the treatment of tax liability under
the Bankruptcy Code.
State and local governments use the tax foreclosure process to execute sovereign power to levy and collect tax on real property.59 To
strike an appropriate balance between state and federal power, the Tax
Injunction Act (TIA) prohibits a federal court from hearing a challenge
to a tax claim under state law whenever “a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such a state.”60 The purpose of the
TIA is to preserve the fundamental balance between national and state
governmental power with respect to taxation..61
The Bankruptcy Code provides a narrow exception to the TIA. Under
§ 505(a)(1), a bankruptcy court may determine the “amount or legality
of any tax” except in circumstances specified in subsection (a)(2). The
pertinent limitations are expressed in subsections (a)(2)(A) and (C).
Subsection (a)(2)(A) incorporates res judicata (claim preclusion) as a
limit on the bankruptcy court’s power to determine tax liability.62 It bars
the bankruptcy court from determining the amount or legality of a tax if
it “was contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative
tribunal of competent jurisdiction.”63 Congress added subsection (a)(2)
(C) as part of the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform Act.64 It bars a bankruptcy
court from considering the amount or legality of an ad valorem tax on
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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real or personal property of the estate, “if the applicable period for contesting or redetermining that amount under any law (other than a bankruptcy law) has expired.”65 Thus subsection (a)(2)(C) overrules prior
cases that interpreted § 505(a) to allow a bankruptcy court to determine
tax claims even after the time for disputing the claim had expired under
nonbankruptcy law.66
Congress offered no express guidance as to how to reconcile the
prohibition on interference in matters of state taxation made clear in
§ 505(a)(2)(A) and (C) with the trustee’s fraudulent transfer avoiding
power under § 548(a)(1)(B). A challenge to a state tax foreclosure transfer on fraudulent transfer grounds under § 548 is an act to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax” barred
under the TIA. And it is a challenge to the “amount or legality of a tax”
under § 505. As such, it is subject to the TIA and also to the limited exceptions to the injunction provided in § 505(a). Once the debtor’s equity
of redemption is extinguished under state law, under § 505(A)(2)(c), the
bankruptcy court may not exercise jurisdiction because “the applicable
period for contesting or redetermining [the tax] under [nonbankruptcy
law] has expired.” If the foreclosure transfer is not final at the time that
the bankruptcy case is filed, a bankruptcy court determining the amount
or legality of tax under § 505 must apply nonbankruptcy tax law.67 The
bankruptcy court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the state or
local government regarding the amount or legality of the debtor’s taxes.
Although no court to date has considered squarely whether a § 548
challenge to a tax foreclosure transfer is an act to “enjoin, suspend or
restrain” the levy of a tax subject to the TIA and § 505, the court in In re
Northbrook Partners LLP held that the debtor’s challenge to real property taxes on grounds that they were larger than they should be under
proper assessment is a challenge to the amount or legality of taxes under
§ 505(a).68 An action to avoid a tax foreclosure transfer on grounds that
it was for “less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange” is analogous. In both situations, the payment on account of taxes is, in the view
of the challenger, larger than the law allows.
The counterargument is that a fraudulent transfer challenge to a tax
foreclosure transfer is not an act to restrain the levy of a tax or a determination of the amount or legality of a tax and does not trigger the TIA
or § 505. This argument fails for several reasons. First, the legal distinction between a challenge to a tax foreclosure transfer and a challenge to
the amount or legality of a tax quickly collapses upon considering the
common purpose of §§ 548 and 505. Both recognize a limited power
for a bankruptcy court to redefine state law property rights. They also
share a common bankruptcy purpose—to protect the debtor, and deriva© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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tively his creditors, from dissipation of the estate’s assets caused by the
debtor’s failure to protect his own interests (by contesting a tax bill or
resisting a wealth-depleting exchange) during his slide into insolvency
before filing for bankruptcy relief.69 Section 548 applies to a wide variety of wealth-depleting events, whereas § 505 applies to tax liability.
Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the specific treatment of challenges to tax claims in § 505 should prevail over the general in § 548.70
A second possible counterargument rests on the effect of avoidance
of a tax foreclosure. Arguably, avoidance of a tax foreclosure transfer
under § 548 does not trigger the TIA because after avoidance, the tax
debt will remain secured by a first lien on the property.71 Thus avoidance
of a tax foreclosure transfer is not a challenge to the amount or legality of taxes. Rather, the sole function of a § 548 challenge is to recover
for the estate the surplus of value over tax debt lost by a constructively
fraudulent transfer, and thus section 505 does not apply.
The court in Murphy did not consider the possible application of the
TIA or section 505, but it did note the distinction between a tax creditor
who retains a priming lien on the property for tax debt after fraudulent
transfer avoidance and other creditors whose interests may be avoided
under section 548.72 The case presented an unusual situation. The market value of the property transferred to the town under New York strict
foreclosure law was sufficient to pay all creditor claims against the estate with some left over. The court held that the transfer was avoidable
but only to the extent necessary to pay the claims of creditors.73 The
town was entitled to the balance, which was more than sufficient to
cover the debtor’s taxes. The debtor recovered nothing. The court noted
that its holding “impinged on a state regulatory scheme” but “only to
the extent that the scheme conflicts with the clear dictates of the Bankruptcy Code.”74
The argument that section 548 does not affect state sovereignty over
taxation because only the value of property in excess of the tax debt is
at stake ignores the economic reality of property tax collection. The tax
collector’s right to the surplus value is an integral part of the tax collection process and, indeed, an integral part of real property tax.75 Even
though fraudulent transfer avoidance leaves intact the tax creditor’s lien
in the property to the extent of the tax debt,76 the prospect of loss of the
surplus upon fraudulent transfer avoidance is not inconsequential to the
state’s interest in collecting taxes.
The tax creditor’s ability to foreclose the debtor’s property interest
in the surplus creates a powerful incentive for the debtor to pay the tax.
At the end of the foreclosure process, the tax creditor or its assignee is
entitled to a deed to the property free of interests junior to the tax lien
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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(such as a mortgage). Thus the right to obtain the surplus by foreclosure
creates an incentive for mortgagees to monitor the debtor and pay the
tax if he does not.77 In bad times especially, when property values fall
and people owe more on their property than it is worth, the tax creditor’s right to foreclose the interests of mortgagees and other junior lien
creditors is an important tool to ensure that someone remains interested
in paying the tax.
Moreover, if the right to the surplus is subject to a bankruptcy-created cloud, the price that foreclosure sale bidders are willing to pay for the
tax collector’s rights declines.78 Bidders at tax foreclosure sales subject
to the debtor’s equity of redemption take into account the risk associated with the prospect that the debtor will redeem by paying the tax
before the expiration of the statutory redemption period. If this period
is subject to extension in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, the value
of the property at auction declines further.
The tax collector’s case for the surplus remains troubling for those
who view the tax collector’s victory as a windfall at the expense of the
debtor. In the debtor’s bankruptcy, the debtor’s loss falls on helpless
creditors. Their right to justice comes from federal bankruptcy power to
avoid such a transfer under § 548.
Justice for debtors and their creditors against the tax collector is in
the eye of the beholder. State and local governments view the “fairness”
of their tax foreclosure laws differently than bankruptcy courts who are
primarily concerned with creditors of the estate. Tax foreclosure laws
reflect the history of economic expansion and real property development in the U.S. Throughout the 19th century, enforcement of the tax
collector’s rights against the tax debtor in personam required personal
service on the debtor within the territorial limits of the state.79 A tax
debtor who had left the jurisdiction left his in personam liability behind.
Tax collectors relied on enforcement of in rem rights against the property to satisfy tax debt and to resolve issues of title to property subject
to taxation.80
At the beginning of the 20th century, expedited in rem proceedings against the debtor’s property to satisfy tax debt were the norm.
The debtor and his creditors were entitled to notice of the tax foreclosure process, typically by publication not personal service.81 Model tax
foreclosure legislation at the mid-20th century emphasized swift, final,
low-cost tax foreclosure, with minimal emphasis on time-consuming,
expensive notice or other procedures that might increase the foreclosure
sale price of the property for the benefit of the debtor or third parties
with interests in it.82
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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By the mid-20th century, federal due process jurisprudence took a
different view of the swift and low-cost in rem tax foreclosure process
and its effect on the nonvigilant debtor and his creditors. In Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,83 the Court invalidated any distinction in the type of notice required in rem and in personam proceedings.
For jurisdiction over any dispute, interested parties are entitled to “notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise [them]
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.”84
In 1983, the Supreme Court in Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams85
considered a mortgagee’s constitutional due process challenge to foreclosure of its interest in property by a property tax foreclosure. Under
Indiana law, the owner was entitled to notice of the sale by certified
mail, but mortgagees were entitled to notice by publication only.86 By
the time that the mortgagee learned of the tax sale, the redemption period had run, and the purchaser had applied for a deed to the property
and initiated an action to quiet title.87 The mortgagee argued that it had
not received constitutionally adequate notice of the tax sale or the opportunity to redeem the property following the sale.88
The Court held that the 14th Amendment guaranty of due process requires that a government conducting a tax foreclosure sale must provide
notice to a mortgagee “reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending
tax sale.”89 If the mortgagee is identifiable in a publicly recorded mortgage,
constructive notice by publication is not sufficient. The tax collector must
also provide notice by mail to the mortgagee’s last known address.90
The dissent in Mennonite took up the case of the tax collector. It reasoned that the majority improperly ignored the ability of the mortgagee
to look after its own interests.91 A mortgagee knows that property tax on
the mortgaged property will be assessed on regular intervals and, armed
with this knowledge, could protect its interests. “The historical justification for constructive notice was that those with an interest in property were under an obligation to act reasonably in keeping themselves
informed of proceedings that affected that property.”92 Foreshadowing
the majority opinion in In re BFP, the dissent noted that the state’s interest in collection of tax revenue is vital and federal intrusion should
be kept to the barest minimum.93 In response to the majority’s suggestion that mailing foreclosure notices to record owners and lien holders
rather than publication might better serve the tax collector, the dissent
retorted: “The Court neglects the fact that the State is a better judge of
how it wants to settle its tax debts than this Court.”94
After Mennonite, many states modified or completely overhauled
real property tax foreclosure procedures.95 The circuits split on the level
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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of diligence in notifying parties with an interest in the property that the
constitution requires. In Jones v. Flowers,96 the Supreme Court considered whether the due process clause requires a government to take
additional steps to notify a tax debtor when a notice of tax sale sent by
certified mail is returned undelivered.97 Justice Roberts for the majority
held that while the tax debtor should have been more diligent regarding his property, the government must do more than simply “shrug [its]
shoulders” and say “I tried” after the notice of tax foreclosure came
back unclaimed.98 The Court held that the state should have taken “additional reasonable steps” to notify the taxpayer of the sale and that its
failure to take those steps was an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process.99 Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia
and Kennedy, dissented. An attempt to notify a tax debtor of impending foreclosure by certified mail at his address of record satisfies due
process. “Due process requires nothing more—and certainly not here,
where petitioner had a statutory duty to pay his taxes and to report any
change of address to the state taxing authority.”100
Due process challenges to tax foreclosure proceedings offer a promising strategy to address the equitable concern for the debtor and his
creditors. Consider In re Pontes, decided before the Court’s opinion in
Jones, in which a delinquent tax debtor successfully argued in a Chapter
13 case that the Rhode Island tax foreclosure process was constitutionally defective.101 The City of Providence sold the debtor’s residence at a
tax sale to recover delinquent property tax. The debtor received by mail
a tax sale notice alerting him to the right to avoid the sale by paying the
tax. The debtor did not pay, the sale was held, and a third party bought
the property for the tax debt. At the end of the one-year statutory redemption period, the purchaser filed a petition to foreclose the tax lien
and served it on the debtor. The debtor filed for relief under Chapter 13
and brought an adversary proceeding against the City to recover title to
the property.102 Although the market value of the house exceeded the
tax debt, the debtor did not seek to avoid the transfer as a constructive
fraud under § 548. Instead, he argued that the tax sale occurred without
sufficient notice to him of his right to redeem the property in violation
of his constitutional right to due process.103
The bankruptcy court held that it had jurisdiction under § 505(a) to
consider the legality of the debtor’s taxes and specifically to determine
whether the Rhode Island tax sale process provided the debtor with
constitutionally required due process regarding notice of his right to
redeem property after a tax sale.104 It held that the tax foreclosure statute
“create[d] an unreasonable risk of erroneous deprivation of a significant
property interest” and was constitutionally defective.105 Although the
© 2009 Thomson Reuters
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debtor knew that he had not paid the property tax and that his home was
to be sold, the fact that he did not receive notice of his right to redeem
the property following the sale was an unconstitutional deprivation of
due process.
V. Conclusion
Although the particular issue considered in this article is narrow, the
issue is part of a larger controversy. The case for the tax collector’s right
to the surplus against a fraudulent transfer challenge is difficult to make
because tax foreclosure and fraudulent transfer law differ on the appropriate standard of fairness to creditors. Fraudulent transfer law elevates
the fair market transfer as the archetype of fairness. The tax foreclosure
process departs from this norm because a process designed to achieve
the highest possible value in exchange for tax delinquent property is a
luxury that state and local governments cannot afford. State and local
governments need a foreclosure process that creates a strong incentive
for the debtor and mortgagees to pay property tax even as property values decline. They need a swift way to pass clear and final title to tax
delinquent and abandoned property to purchasers who will occupy the
property and stem the tide of urban blight. From the tax collector’s perspective, a tax foreclosure process that achieves these goals is fair to
taxpayers who pay their taxes and those who do not.
This article considers who decides which perspective on fairness
governs the trustee’s fraudulent transfer avoiding power in a bankruptcy
case. Even after BFP, courts continue to cling to the view that the Court
rejected in that case — that the foreclosure process yields “a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange” only if it provides for transfer by competitive bidding and market-like conditions. In BFP, the Court rejected the
fair market transfer as the relevant archetype. It held that state and local
foreclosure transfers yield reasonably equivalent value because control
of the foreclosure process is the province of state law, which Congress
has not clearly preempted. Moreover, as of 2005, section 505(a)(2)(C)
expressly preempts bankruptcy court interference in state tax foreclosure transfers.
The tax collector can state with confidence that competitive bidding
and market-like conditions of a tax foreclosure transfer do not matter.
Due process, not fraudulent transfer law, supplies the relevant safeguard
for debtors and their creditors in bankruptcy.
NOTES
1.
See, e.g., Arthur D. Lynn, Jr., Property Tax Development: Selected Historical
Perspective, in Property Taxation USA 4, 7-8 (1967); Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales
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one of the worst forms of taxation from virtually every perspective”).
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International Version).
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American Dream: An Evaluation of State and Federal Foreclosure Laws, 51 Okla. L. Rev. 229,
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& Robert W. Burchell, Residential Tax Delinquency: A Forerunner to Residential Abandonment,
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8.
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Foreclosure Process, 36 Mich. Real Prop. Rev. 30 (2009) (describing and evaluating Michigan’s
tax lien foreclosure law enacted in 1999 to combat urban blight).
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bankruptcy law, citing, e.g., United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,
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Cas. 2d (MB) 1158, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 73083 (11th Cir. 1989) (abrogated by, BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 114 S. Ct. 1757, 128 L. Ed. 2d 556, 25 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 1051, 30 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 345, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 75885 (1994)).
30. Matter of Bundles, 856 F.2d 815, 18 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 554, Bankr. L. Rep.
(CCH) P 72461 (7th Cir. 1988) (abrogated by, BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 114
S. Ct. 1757, 128 L. Ed. 2d 556, 25 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1051, 30 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB)
345, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 75885 (1994)).
31. Matter of Bundles, 856 F.2d at 824-25.
32. In response to the dissent’s assertion that the meaning of “reasonably equivalent
value” is plain (“the bankruptcy court must compare the price received by the insolvent debtor
and the worth of the item when sold and set aside the transfer if the former was substantially…
less than the latter” BFP, 511 U.S. at 552), the majority agreed but pointed out that the dissent’s
statement begs the question: what is foreclosed property worth? BFP, 511 U.S. at 546-47.
33. BFP, 511 U.S. at 537.
34. BFP, 511 U.S. at 538. The Court cited to a standard definition of “fair market value:”
the hypothetical price “as would be fixed by negotiation and mutual agreement, after ample
time to find a purchaser, as between a vendor who is willing (but not compelled) to sell and a
purchaser who desires to buy but is not compelled to take the particular… piece of property.”
BFP, 511 U.S. at 538, citing Black’s Law Dictionary 971 (6th ed. 1990).
35. BFP, 511 U.S. at 539.
36. BFP, 511 U.S. at 540.
37. BFP, 511 U.S. at 540.
38. BFP, 511 U.S. at 540.
39. BFP, 511 U.S. at 542, citing G. Osborne, Mortgages 144, 683, 733-35 (2d ed. 1977).
40. BFP, 511 U.S. at 545 (“While, under fraudulent transfer law, a grossly inadequate
price raises a rebuttable presumption of actual fraudulent intent, it is black letter foreclosure law
that, when a State’s procedures re followed, the mere inadequacy of a foreclosure sale price is no
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41. The Court explained the history of foreclosure law from its origin in English courts of
chancery to modern times. BFP, 511 U.S. at 541-543. States’ power to provide for and regulate
creditor-initiated foreclosure of real property interests is an “essential state interest.” BFP, 511
U.S. at 544, citing American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 60, 31 S. Ct. 200, 55 L. Ed. 82 (1911)
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ensure security of title to real property “inheres in the very nature of [state] government.”), but
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Co. as conversion of a “stray phrase” in that case “into a pronouncement about the allocation of
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42. BFP, 511 U.S. at 543.
43. BFP, 511 U.S. at 543.
44. BFP, 511 U.S. at 537, n.3.
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Dec. (CRR) 839, 12 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 605 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejected by, In re DeVito,
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2323 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Fitzgerald, 255 B.R. 807, 37 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 18
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reasonably equivalent value); In re Washington, 232 B.R. 340, 349 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999)
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, 435(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (Pennsylvania mortgage and tax lien foreclosure processes require
competitive bidding); In re Russell-Polk, 200 B.R. 218, 221, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 952
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1996) (comparing Missouri tax lien and mortgage foreclosure processes to
ascertain whether the tax process provides notice to the owner and competitive bidding similar
to mortgage foreclosure process); In re Lord, 179 B.R. 429, 434 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (“We
may not conclude that reasonably equivalent value has been provided simply because the
applicable state statutory requirements have been met”); In re Golden, 190 B.R. 52, 58 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1995) (same). Courts have adopted this comparative approach for state-regulated
forced transfers other than tax lien foreclosure, e.g., In re Grady, 202 B.R. 120, 124, 29 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1169 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1996) (forfeiture of debtor’s interest under a defaulted
land sale contract by operation of state law was fraudulent transfer); but see In re Vermillion,
176 B.R. 563, 26 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 598, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 76377 (Bankr. D. Or.
1994) (applying In re BFP to land sale contract forfeiture under Oregon law); and to mortgage
foreclosures, e.g., In re Fitzgerald, 237 B.R. 252, 266 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (Connecticut strict
mortgage foreclosure process).
49. E.g., Murphy, 331 B.R. at 119-21 (New York tax lien forfeiture process did not yield
reasonably equivalent value); In re Wentworth, 221 B.R. 316, 40 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB)
132 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998) (Maine’s tax lien strict foreclosure process without public sale did
not yield reasonably equivalent value).
50. Murphy, 331 B.R. 107.
51. Murphy, 331 B.R. at 114.
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52. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1120, N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1136[1]. Note that the tax
collector’s option to direct a sale of real property subject to tax foreclosure was omitted when the
statute was amended in 1995. See In re Harris, 2003 Bankr. Lexis 2323 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2003).
53. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law at §§ 1125 (tax creditor must serve the property owner by
certified mail with petition for foreclosure and the deadline for redemption by payment of taxes
and penalties); 1124 (providing for published notice of foreclosure in at least two newspapers
for three nonconsecutive weeks in a two-month period); 1101 (debtor’s redemption period
expires two years from the date of the tax lien or upon the date specified in the published notice
of foreclosure as long as that date is more than two years from the date of the tax lien); and
1136 (if the debtor does not redeem or answer, the tax creditor is entitled to conveyance of the
property in fee simple).
54. Murphy, 331 B.R. at 114. The circumstances of the transfer were somewhat unusual
in that the debtor asserted an interest in the property net of the claims of creditors. At the time of
the transfer, the fair market value of the property was greater than $1 million. The debtor owed
creditors approximately $700,000. Murphy, 331 B.R. at 114-15. The debtor intervened in the
adversary proceeding between the trustee and the Town. Murphy, 331 B.R. at 115.
55. Murphy, 331 B.R. at 115.
56. Murphy, 331 B.R. at 115.
57. See supra notes 47-48.
58. BFP, 511 U.S. at 539; but see BFP, 511 U.S. at 557, n.10 (Souter, J. in dissent):
[T]he analogy proposed ignores the patent difference between these two aspects of the
‘regulatory background’… while the zoning ordinance would reduce the value of the
property “to the world,” foreclosure rules affect not the price any purchaser ‘would pay’
[reference omitted] but rather the means by which the mortgagee is permitted to extract
its entitlement from the entire ‘value’ of the property.
Justice Scalia rejects the distinction, reasoning that even if creditors’ foreclosure rights are
procedural, they affect the value of the property the same as zoning restrictions.). BFP, 511 U.S.
at 540. See also BFP, 511 U.S. at 548 (foreclosure redefines the market for the property).
59. See Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. 108, 20 L. Ed. 65, 1870 WL 12848 (1870):
It is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on their
respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the modes
adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible. Any
delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the
taxes, may derange the operations of government, and thereby cause serious detriment
to the public.
60. Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1937) (“The district courts shall not enjoin,
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain,
speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” Under a judicially created
exception to the TIA, the U.S. and its instrumentalities “can initiate actions in federal court to
protect themselves from “unconstitutional state exactions”). See Simon v. Cebrick, 53 F.3d 17,
22 (3d Cir. 1995); Department of Employment v. U.S., 385 U.S. 355, 358, 87 S. Ct. 464, 17 L.
Ed. 2d 414 (1966).
61. Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services of Cent. Arkansas, 520 U.S. 821, 826-27, 117 S. Ct.
1776, 138 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1997) (noting that the TIA reflects “a congressional concern to confine
federal court intervention in state government”).
62. In re Northbrook Partners LLP, 245 B.R. 104, 35 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 207 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 2000).
63. 11 U.S.C.A. § 505(a)(2)(A) (2005). See In re Mantz, 343 F.3d 1207, 41 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 285, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 78916 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a tax liability is not
“adjudicated” for purposes of this subsection unless the adjudication had become final before
the petition date).
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64. Pub. L. 109-8, § 701(b)(3) (2005).
65. 11 U.S.C.A. § 505(a)(2)(C) (2005). To date, no reported cases have applied § 505(a)(C).
Two bankruptcy courts have noted it as a new limitation on a bankruptcy court’s power to adjudicate
tax claims. In re Melvin, 410 B.R. 705, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-1836 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2009); In re
Delafield 246 Corp., 368 B.R. 285, 48 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 57 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2007).
66. In re Ledgemere Land Corp., 135 B.R. 193, 196-97, 22 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 669,
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 74383 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (the debtor may contest tax debts in
bankruptcy court even though his prior inaction would bar him from contesting them under
nonbankruptcy law); In re Home and Housing of Dade County, Inc., 220 B.R. 492, 494-95
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (§ 505 jurisdiction gives the debtor a new opportunity to contest the tax without
regard to the time limits applicable in another forum); In re 499 W. Warren Street Associates,
Ltd. Partnership, 143 B.R. 326, 329 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1992) (same).
67. E.g., In re R-P Packaging, Inc., 278 B.R. 281, 48 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 948
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002); In re A.C. Williams Co., 51 B.R. 496, 498, 13 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
523 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (“there is nothing in the history of bankruptcy or reorganization
legislation to support the theory that Congress intended to set the federal courts up as superassessment tribunals over state taxing agencies”). Cf. Matter of Carlson, 126 F.3d 915, 920,
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 77508, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 50702, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 97-6558 (7th
Cir. 1997) (bankruptcy court could not invalidate federal income tax liability under its general
equitable power in § 105 because § 505 provided exclusive and limited basis for challenging
taxes in bankruptcy court).
68. In re Northbrook Partners LLP, 245 B.R. 104, 115, 35 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 207
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2000).
69. E.g., In re New Haven Projects Ltd. Liability Co., 225 F.3d 283, 288-89 36 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 198, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 78265 (2d Cir. 2000); City Vending of Muskogee,
Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Com’n, 898 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1990); Central Valley AG Enterprises v.
U.S., 531 F.3d 750, 755, 50 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 49, 59 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1624,
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 81269, 2008-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 50405, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 20082682 (9th Cir. 2008), citing In re Mantz, 343 F.3d 1207, 1211, 41 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 285,
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P 78916 (9th Cir. 2003) (grant of jurisdiction over tax liability “protects
a debtor from being bound by a pre-bankruptcy tax liability determination that, because of a
lack of financial resources, he or she was unable to contest” and protects creditors of the estate
by allowing the estate to contest a debtor’s prebankruptcy tax liability). The bankruptcy court’s
authority to determine the amount or legality of a tax claim also offers a forum for adjudication
of tax issues that might otherwise delay the orderly administration of the case and distribution
to the debtor’s creditors. See In re D’Alessio, 181 B.R. 756, 759-60, 76 A.F.T.R.2d 95-5001
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1995).
70. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228-29, 77 S. Ct. 787,
1 L. Ed. 2d 786, 113 U.S.P.Q. 234 (1957) (“However inclusive may be the general language of
a statute, it ‘will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the
same enactment… [s]pecific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which
otherwise might be controlling”‘); Markair, Inc. v. C.A.B., 744 F.2d 1383, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984) (
“It is a well-settled canon of statutory interpretation that specific provisions prevail over general
provisions”).
71. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (2005).
72. “Defendant is not denied its very important interest in securing payment of outstanding
tax obligations by reason of avoidance of the transfer to the extent necessary to protect other
creditors.” Murphy, 331 B.R. at 121.
73. Murphy, 331 B.R. at 121.
74. Murphy, 331 B.R. at 121. A similar argument is that the surplus is in effect a penalty.
The tax creditor’s (or its assignee’s) interest in it is in the nature of a claim for penalty against
the taxpayer, subject to subordination in a Chapter 7 case to the claims of claims of general
unsecured creditors under § 726(a)(4).
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75. E.g., In re Hemstreet, 258 B.R. 134, 138, 37 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 88 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 2001), citing Povlow v. Brown, 12 Pa. Commw. 303, 307, 315 A.2d 375, 377 (1974) (“[t]he
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